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not frequently be in accord with sound public policy, as well as to
the best interests of the minor children, to reduce the burden of the
one liable for the support when it becomes apparent that to deny such
reduction would be to work undue hardship on the father? "There
is no virtue in killing the goose which laid the golden eggs.""4
C. M. H.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
oHio GENErAL CODE SECTION 10512-19-RIGHT OF AN
ADOPTED CHILD TO INHERIT THROUGH ITS ADOPTIVE
PARENT
Lena Post died intestate, survived by two brothers and an adopted
son of her deceased sister. Upon a petition by her administrator to
determine the heirs of the estate, the Probate Court excluded the
adopted child as an heir. On appeal the Court of Appeals of Cuya-
hoga county reversed the Probate Court and held that the statute
4 descent and distribution, Ohio General Code, Section 10503-4 (6),
hen construed in connection with the adoption statute, Ohio Gen-
eral Code, Section 10512-19, permits an adopted child to inherit not
only from but also through its adoptive parent. White, Adm., v.
Meye'r, 66 Ohio App. 549, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 151 (1940).
The principal case is the most authoritative direct holding re-
ported since the adoption statute was amended in 1932. ' In arriving
at its decision the court disposes of a line of Supreme Court cases
to the contrary, by pointing out that they were all decided before the
1932 amendment was added to the adoption statute There are not
many reported cases interpreting the effect of this amendment. In
reading them one denotes a tendency on the part of the courts to
adhere to the rule established by the outmoded Supreme Court de-
I2 Lloyd, J., dissenting, in Campbell v. Campbell, 46 Ohio App. 197. See also dis-
-trting opinion of Zimmerman, J., in 138 Ohio St. 187, 20ot.1Sec Note (1940) 7 Ontio Sr. r L. J. 441, where the previous Ohio cases are dis-
cm-od.
Albright v. Albright, 116 Ohio St. 668, 157 N. E. 760 (1927); Phillips v. McConica,
39 Ohio St. 1, 51 N. E. 445 (1S3); Quigley v. Mitchell, 41 Ohio St. 375 (1884); Upson
v, Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655 (180).
3General Code, Section 10512-19, Effective Jan. 1, 1932, replaced former Section
>n630, and added the following words: "but shall be capable of inheriting property e-x-
pe-:ly limited by will or by operation of law to the child or children, heir or heirs at
law, or ncxt of kin, of the adopting parept or parents, or to a class including any of the
foreyeing."
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cisions, that an adopted child can inherit from but not through its
adoptive parent.! In fact a dissenting opinion in the principal case
urges preservation of the old rule unless and until some statute ex-
pressly says that an adopted child can inherit through its adoptive
parent.
It is difficult to predict the effect which the holding in the prin-
cipal case will have in settling this controversial question of probate
law. Writers as well as courts have differed as to the correct con-
struction of the inheritance provision of the adoption statute.' This
decision is Unique in the sense that there is little case support for it
in Ohio.' The lack of uniformity in interpreting this statute cannot
be traced to faulty draftsmanship. Rather it is the result of a will-
ingness on the part of courts to follow precedent without regard to
changes in a social policy as evidenced by legislative enactments.
The purpose of General Code, Section io512-i9 was to accord to
adopted children the same treatment as that given to natural chil-
dren, by abolishing the old rule that an adopted child cannot inherit
through itsadoptive parent. The language there used seems adequate
to accomplish that purpose. In construing this language all possible
doubts as to the legislative intent could easily be resolved by looking
to the comments and recommendations of the special Committee of
In a direct holding that an adopted child is not the issue of the ancestor of her
adoptive parent within the meaning of the term "issue" as used in the testator's will, the
Court of Appeals in Reinhard, v. Reinhard, 23 Ohio I...\bs. 306 (1936), relied upon the
Supreme Court cases cited note 3 supra. This case may be distinguished due to the re-
stricted meaning sometimes attached to the word "issue", but the language of Section
10512-19, seems broad enough to bring' adopted children within a limitation to "issue".
The court in Rogers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182 N. E. 654 (1932), avoided con-
struing General Code, Section 10512-19, but referred to the Supreme Court decisions in
construing former Section 8030, General Code, adversely to the adopted children by find.
ing that they could not take as issue or childrcit of the settlor's deceased son. In twn
analogous cases holding that a designated heir can inherit from but not through the
declarant, the courts referred to General Code, Section 10512-19, and construed it as not
having changed the former rule laid down by the Supreme Court. Rogers v. Cromer,
24 Ohio L. Abs. 508 (1937), Noted (1937) 4 0so ST. L. J. 97; Southern Ohio Sav'ings
Bank f Trust Co. v. Boyer, 66 Ohio App. 136, 31 N. E. (2d) 161, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 626
(1940), Noted (1940) 7 OHo ST. L. J. 441, Noted (1941) 15 CxcINNATI L. Rxv. 348.
-'In a Note (1937) 4 01to ST. L. J. 97, the writer seems to approve of the rule that
an adopted child can inherit froin but not through the adopting parent. Contra and in
qupport of the view taken by the court in the principal case, Note (1940) 7 Oirxo STATE
L. J. 441; DiF.BEL, OHIO PROBATE LAW (2d Ed. 1932) 1136 Sec. 1180; L aCac, OH1o
PRos.%TE DIGEST A.D PRACTICE 'MANUAL (3d Ed. 1937) 515 Sec. 794 (b).
0 Shearer Adin. v. Gasstman, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 103, 31 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 219 (1933),
is a Probate Court decision in line with the principal case. The cases of Smith v. Hunter,
86 Ohio St. 106, 99 N. E. 91 (1912), and Hummel v. Dazis, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 49 (1936),
though not squarely in point are nevertheless more in sympathy with the view of
the principal case than with the contrary position. In re Estate of Griffin, 33 Ohio
L. Abs. 270, 19 Ohio Op. 377 (1935), contains a dictum that the present adoption
statute enlarges an adopted child's right of inheritance.
NOTES
the Bar Association which drafted Section io5i2-i9.' This Com-
mittee believed that the former statute, General Code, Section 8o3o,
was sufficiently broad to permit inheritance through the adoptive
parent, but in the face of contrary interpretation by the courts, the
Committee recommended that the additional language of Section
10512-i9 be inserted.' The court in the principal case takes cog-
nizance of this statutory development and carries out its purpose by
allowing the adopted child to inherit through its adoptive parent.
J. P. M.
EQUITY
INJUNCTION - AGAINST INEQUITABLE LITIGATION IN
FOREIGN JURISDICTION-FEDERAL EmiPLOYERS'
LIABILITY ACT
Kepner, employed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was in-
jured in the course of his employment in Ohio, the state of his resi-
dence. Choosing from among the three federal forums available
under the venue section of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,"
he brought an action for damages in a United States district court
for New York, where the railroad was doing business. After in-
stitution of the suit, the defendant road brought this action in an
Ohio court, asking that Kepner be enjoined from further prosecut-
ing the foreign suit, alleging that it was brought for purposes of
harrassment, that it would cause the defendant great inconvenience
and expense to defend the action 700 miles from the place of injury,
and that a federal district court in Ohio could equitably hear and
decide the case on its merits. Kepner's demurrer was sustained and
the injunction refused. On successive appeals, culminating in the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed, on the ground
that a state court may not enjoin the exercise of the right given by
13Snyder v. Swope, Director of Safety, 23 Ohio L. R. 361, 366 (1922).
1 45 U. S. C. 56, to the effect that an action under the F.E.L.A. may be brought
in the district of the residence of the defendant, in the district in which the cause of
action arose, or in the district in which the defendant is doing busir ' at the time of
tke bringing of the action.
